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 MICROFINANCE IN NEPAL
1 
Determinants of Viability, Sustainability and Outreach 





Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world, with 70% of its population below the poverty line. 
Subsidized national poverty lending programs have failed to attain viability, mobilize savings and 
reach the poor in significant numbers. Informal institutions such as the ubiquitous  dhikuti were 
ignored. During the 90s the government has created a new policy environment focusing on 
decentralization, poverty alleviation, economic and financial liberalization, and a differentiated legal 
framework for microfinance institutions (MFIs). This has paved the way for innovations such as the 
establishment of Grameen replicators as banks; the upgrading of dhikuti activities to savings and 
finance companies with doorstep services; and the transformation of the small farmer credit operations 
of the Agricultural Development Bank into profitable local MFIs cooperatively owned by their 
members. In the framework of a wider UNDP-supported program of the Asian and Pacific 
Development Centre in Kuala Lumpur on Microfinance for the Poor in Asia-Pacific, six MFIs were 
selected from Nepal and analyzed in terms of outreach to the poor, resource mobilization, viability and 
sustainability: two Grameen Bank replicators - one a bank and one an NGO; two NGOs sponsored 
under the government's Rural Self-Reliance Fund; and two cooperatives. The outreach of the NGOs 
was found to be insignificant while the outreach of the Grameen Bikas Bank at the regional level and 
of the cooperatives at the local level was sizeable. The cooperatives performed well in terms of 
portfolio efficiency and were found to be financially viable; the NGOs did reasonably well; while the 
Grameen Bikas Bank, substituting donor funds for internal resources, was lowest (though improving) 
in operational and financial self-sufficiency - despite a 100% on-time repayment rate. On the whole 
all MFIs appeared rather hesitant to utilize their newly won freedom to vigorously expand their 
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1.  Country overview 
 
1.1.  Macroeconomic performance
2 
 
Nepal is among the poorest countries in the world. It has a population of 20 million with a growth rate 
of 2.1%.  There are about 3.2 million households of an average size of 6.2 in some 4,000 
administrative units referred to as  Village Development Committees ( VDCs), each comprising a 
number of dispersed villages.  
 
Per capita income was Rs 12,092 ($212) in the fiscal year (ending mid-July) of 1995/96 of which 
agriculture generated 41%. During the last five years, the economy grew at a rate of 5.0% p.a.; per 
capita income went up by 2.9%; and the rate of inflation averaged 10.5%. The economy is projected to 
grow over the next five years at annual rates around 5-6% while inflation is expected to drop to rates 
between 5% and 8%.  
 
At 12.4% (fiscal year July 1994/July 1995) the domestic savings ratio is low, amounting to only about 
half the investment ratio of 23.5%. This large gap poses a major constraint on economic stability and 
growth. Failing to mobilize the potential savings of the population, financial institutions lack the 
resources to satisfy the demand for credit; while households lack access to deposit facilities to 
accumulate the funds for the self-financing of their enterprises. 
 
1.2.  Poverty incidence 
 
Over 90% of the population of Nepal live in rural areas, more than half of them in hills and mountains 
under precarious environmental conditions. 86% are engaged in agriculture. In 1991 the World Bank 
estimated that 70% are below the poverty line (of a per capita income of $ 150). With a Human 
Development Index (HDI) of 0.332, Nepal ranks number 151 among 174 countries (average HDI for 
South Asia: 0.444). Some of the HDI indicators for Nepal's low level of social development are: a life 
expectancy of 53.8 years; an infant mortality rate of 98 per thousand; an adult female literacy rate of 
13%; and a daily calorie intake of 1,957 per capita. 
 
While average holdings of arable land are about one hectare, the poor possess little more than the land 
on which their home is built: 0.14 ha in the plains and 0.05 ha in the hills (Nepal Rural Credit Review 
Survey, 1994). 
 
1.3.  Poverty alleviation programs 
 
Outreach: There are five programs targeted on the poor with some outreach of significance: the Small 
Farmers Development Programme (SFDP) with 189,000 borrowers, accounting for about half the total 
outreach of poverty lending programs; Intensive Banking Program (IPB) with 85,000 borrowers; 
Production Credit for Rural Women (PCRW) with 27,000 borrowers; Grameen replicators comprising 
five Grameen Bikas Banks and two NGOs (Nirdhan and CSD) with 32,000 borrowers in 7/1995 and 
48,000 borrowers as of 7/1996; plus an estimated number of 12,000 registered and unregistered 
savings & credit organizations and cooperatives with an overall membership of 792,000 
members.Women's participation in these organizations is notably higher. In addition, there are some 
small programs like Banking with the Poor (BP), Rural Self-Reliance Fund (RSF) and Micro Credit 
Project for Women (MCPW) with a total outreach of less than 10,000 borrowers. PCRW, Grameen 
and MCPW exclusively target women. The majority of borrowers from SFDP, IBP and cooperatives 
are male heads of households acting on behalf of the family. ADBN plans to increase the share of 
female borrowers in SFDP to at least 40%. Average loan sizes of the various programs are between 
US$ 60-120, except in IBP with an average of $260. 
 
                                                                 
2  Exchange rate as of June 1996: US$1.- = Rupies (Rs.) 57.   3
Table 1.1:  Outreach of poverty lending programs in Nepal, 1995 and 1996 
Program  Borrowers  Loans outstanding (in 
million  Rs.) 
  Number   Percent female   
SFDP, 1/1996  188,757  22
1  1,275 
IBP, 7/1995  84,811  ?  1,248 









7/1996  48,392  100  188 








BP, 7/1995  3,585   80  18 
RSF, 7/1995  2,931   ?  11 
MCPW, 7/1995  1,750  100  20 
1This official statistic is based on the percentage of all-female groups; the Project has in the past 
lumped together all-male and mixed groups. Hence, the actual percentage of female members is 
presumably higher than 22%. 
²792,000 members, not borrowers. 
 
The outreach of informal financial institutions, particularly nonrotating local savings and credit groups 
on which there are no statistics, appears to be far greater than that of the formal system. Unlike urban 
rotating savings groups (dhikuti), which have evolved into the small businessman's self-help bank
3, 
nonrotating groups mainly recruit their members from among the poorer section of the rural 
population. As these institutions mobilize their resources internally, there is invariably a strong 
emphasis on savings. Recently, finance companies have started to mobilize savings throughout the 
informal sector. The financial services are mostly concentrated in urban areas. One of them, the 
Himalaya Savings and Finance Company, employs some 600 daily deposit collectors. Major 
constraints to an increase in outreach of the formal sector appear to lie in their reliance on donor-
driven government programs rather than autonomous savings-driven local financial intermediaries; 
their preoccupation with microcredit rather than microsavings and microinsurance; and their lack of 
financial viability. 
 
Financial viability: There are two major factors which have rendered most government-supported 
poverty lending programs unviable: a historically low repayment rate; and grossly insufficient interest 
rate spreads. There were times when borrowers considered loan defaulting as an act of political 
defiance in the pursuit of democracy while the winning party felt subsequently obligated to reward its 
followers by waving the repayment of their loans.  
 
As of July 1995, the repayment rate was 44% in SFDP and 41% in IBP, while arrears (amount overdue 
in percent of amount due) were 20% and 24%, respectively.
4 With a repayment rate of 82%, the 
                                                                 
3  Hans Dieter Seibel & Bishnu P. Shrestha, Dhikuti: the Small Businessman's Informal Self-Help Bank in 
Nepal. Savings and Development (Milan) vol. 12 no. 2 (1988): 183-200.  Meena Acharya, Bishnu P. Shrestha & 
Hans Dieter Seibel, Self-Help Groups in Nepal. Asia Pacific Rural Finance (Bangkok) vol. 1 no. 1 (1988): 3-6.  
Hans Dieter Seibel & Uttam Dhakhwa,  From Informal to Formal Microfinance: The Transformation of the 
Dhikuti in Nepal. Asia Pacific Rural Finance (1997). 
4  In the past there was usually no write-off policy in these programs. 
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performance of PCRW, which is targeted on women, has been much better, but still far from 
satisfactory. Only the Grameen replicators, established between March 1993 and July 1995, report a 
repayment rate of 100% as of July 1996. However, the outstanding performance of the Grameen 
replicators as well as of PCRW may be partially due to the recency of their origin as SFDP and IBP 
similarly reported repayment rates of 100% during the year of their inception (1976/77 and 1981/82, 
respectively), dropping rather sharply to 86% and 63%, respectively, in the following year. In 
subsequent years, their peaks were 63% (1983/84) and 80% (1985/86), respectively, while their lows 
were 39% (1990/91) and 40% (1992/93), respectively. 
 
For the three major programs, SFDP, IBP and PCRW, the World Bank calculated their subsidy 
dependency during the three fiscal years from 1989 to 1992. It found wide discrepancies between 
actual and required cost-covering interest rates: 18.1% vs. 42.5 % in SFDP; 15.6% vs. 43.5% in IBP; 
and 15.6% vs. 72.4% in PCRW.  
 
Table 1.2:Viability indicators of poverty lending programs in Nepal 
 
Program  Repayment 
rate* 
Arrears ratio*  On-lending interest rate  Subsidy dependency 
index*** 
      Actual**  Required**   
SFDP   43.6  20.1  18.1  42.5  1.35 
IBP   41.4  23.6  15.55  43.5  1.80 
PCRW   82.0  ?  15.55  72.4  3.66 
*  1994/95 
**  1991/92 
***  (Required rate - average rate)/average rate (Jacob Yaron, The World Bank) 
 
The remedies to the disease of unviability seem clear: insistence on, and incentives for, timely 
repayment; elimination of interest rate subsidies in favor of cost-covering rates of interest; and 
lowering of transaction costs. How this can be achieved has recently been demonstrated by ADBN in 
its SFDP. By transforming its sub-project offices into autonomous cooperative local financial 
institutions (SFCL) owned and managed by their members, the repayment rate of funds channeled by 
ADBN through the SFCL against a commission increased in the first four SFCL established in 
Dhading, one of the poorest areas in  Nepal, from around 40% to 79%; the repayment rate of funds 
mobilized by the SFCLs from its own members was 100% (1/1996); and their administrative expenses 
according to project statistics were a mere 1.5% of the amount of loans outstanding.  
 
1.4.  Financial institutions and their outreach to the poor 
 
As of July 1995, the financial sector of Nepal mobilized Rs. 68 bn in deposits (US$ 1.2 bn). 
Commercial banks accounted for about 90% of that amount, the Agricultural Development Bank of 
Nepal (ADBN) for about 9%, and the recently formalized finance companies for about 1%. Together, 
Grameen-type development banks, cooperatives and NGOs accounted for only 0.1% of total deposits. 
Commercial bank loans outstanding amounted to Rs. 46.9 bn (88%), ADBN loans to Rs. 6.6 bn (12%). 
Poverty-focussed credit amounted to Rs. 4.0 bn, 31% of which were handled through ADBN's Small 
Farmer Development Project (SFDP), the biggest single provider of poverty loans. ADBN's main 
business is not poverty lending, as indicated by the fact that in mid-1995 SFDP loans accounted for 
18.9% of ADBN's total loan portfolio. 
 
Data concerning outreach to the poor are mostly on credit rather than savings. The savings of the poor 
go largely uncollected. While the poor make up the majority of the population, their share of credit has 
remained minuscule, with poverty focused credit amounting to 7.5% of total bank loans outstanding. 
As of mid-1992, 17% of rural households reported loans outstanding from the formal and 49% from 
the informal sector. These proportions were 6% and 42%, respectively, among the landless. The   5
savings ratio of rural households was estimated at 7%. With an outreach of credit to about 20% of the 
poor in 1/1996, progress since the mid-1970s when the central bank first embarked on poverty lending 
has been moderate. 
  
Table 1.3:Deposits and loans of banks in Nepal, July 1995  






























There are two types of financial institutions with a considerable outreach potential to the poor that 
deserve detailed attention, both of recent origin: Small Farmer Cooperatives Limited (SFCL) and 
Grameen replicators. 
 
SFCL: Since 1975 the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal has built up its Small Farmer 
Development Programme. Major donors were IFAD (US$ 27.5 million) and ADB-Manila (US$ 30 
million). By mid-1996 the program had reached 189,000 heads of households organized in some 
23,000 small farmer groups. Credit disbursement and technical support were administered through 422 
sub-project offices (SPOs). With repayment rates barely above 40% and loss ratios fluctuating mostly 
in the 20s and 30s the program incurred substantial losses. With a largely symbolic savings 
mobilization rate of less than 1% throughout is existence it strongly depended on donor resources.  
 
With technical assistance from GTZ, ADBN has now embarked on a new course of institutional 
transformation. In July 1993, it turned the SFDP operations in four sub-project offices in Dhading, one 
of the poorest districts of Nepal, over to the small farmers themselves, establishing the first four 
SFCLs owned and managed by their members. Each of the four SFCL comprises on average 709 small 
farmers in 100 small farmer groups (73% of them male or mixed and 27% female) organized in turn in 
11 intergroups. It appears that this transformation achieved a miracle: The SFCLs started mobilizing 
their own resources, which reached 20% of all loans outstanding within the first two years of their 
existence; the repayment rate of ADBN channeling loans (which continued unabatedly) virtually 
doubled; and the repayment rate of loans from internal resources jumped to 98% as of 7/1995. While 
the SFCLs still have quite some way to go to full autonomy, there is at least incipient evidence that 
there is a route of transforming the unsustainable operations of a state-owned agricultural development 
bank into viable microfinance institutions that cover their costs from the margin and might eventually 
mobilize their own internal resources.   6
 
Table 1.4:  Performance of 4 SFCL in Dhading after two years of autonomy, 7/1995 
[handover date: July 16, 1993] 
 
Loans from own resources in % of all loans outstanding: 
excluding handover loans: 
20 % 
28 % 
Repayment rate of: 
ADBN handover loan: 
New ADBN channeling loans: 








ADBN handover loan: 
New ADBN channeling loans: 





Transaction costs in % of loans outstanding  1.5 % 
Increase of loans outstanding from internal resources during 





By mid-1996 the operations of thirty SPOs had been converted into autonomous SFLCs, with a total 
outreach of over 20,000 families (representing a population of about 130,000). While ADBN 
continues to establish new small farmer groups through its existing network of SPOs that are to be 
converted into SFCL in due course, it is expected that within six to eight years about 4-500 SFCLs 
will have been established with an outreach of more than 200,000 predominantly poor families (i.e.,. a 
population of 1.2 million). Given their low level of transaction costs and the excellent repayment 
performance, their viability does not appear to be threatened. However, full institutional autonomy and 
self-reliance (including the cessation of loan channeling on ADBN's terms), appropriate supervision 
and the establishment of an apex structure are among the many issues that need to be resolved if 
savings and credit cooperatives of the SFCL type are to evolve into a self-sustained movement with an 
ever-increasing deepening of financial services to the poor. 
 
Grameen Bank replicators: In 1992 the Government of Nepal embarked on a Grameen Bank 
replication program, announcing its plans for the establishment of five Grameen-type rural 
development banks, one in each of the five geographical regions of the country. In 1996 the 
Development Banking Act was passed under which the five Grameen Bikas Banks have been 
registered. In addition there are two NGO replicators existing side by side, testing the appropriateness 
of a bank vs. NGO approach. The main resource base of the Grameen Bikas banks has been their share 
capital amounting to Rs 60 million each of which the central bank, NRB, has provided two thirds. The 
two NGOs were supported by international donors. In addition, commercial banks lent Rs 148.7 
million to the Grameen Bikas banks and Rs 31.6 million to the two NGOs under the compulsory 
deprived sector credit program, totaling Rs 180.3 million which is barely less than the total volume of 
Grameen loans outstanding. Like t he commercial banks in Nepal, the Grameen replicators are 
excessively liquid. Government vs. private ownership of the Grameen-type development banks has 
been an issue of critical debate, reflecting the fear that government intervention might interfere with 
sound banking practices and keep the banks from attaining resource self-reliance and financial 
viability. 
 
The Grameen replicators target exclusively poor women. Starting in 1993, outreach has grown rapidly 
from about 12,500 in mid-1994 to over 50,000 in  mid-1996. With a repayment rate of 100% loan 
recovery so far has been perfect. Members' savings constitute 20% of loans outstanding. Compulsory 
savings in the group fund are the chief instrument of internal resource mobilization, with personal 
voluntary savings amounting to a mere 12% of total savings. Transaction costs of the Grameen type   7
group approach have been substantial and are a big threat to the viability of the institutions. If this 
issue could be resolved and if self-reliance would replace their donor-dependency, they could continue 
to widen their outreach and greatly enrich the financial infrastructure accessible to the poor. 
 
Table 1.5:  Performance of 7 Grameen replicators within their first three years  
(in Rs. million) 
  July 1994  July 1995  July 1996 
1. No. of group members 
2. No. of borrowers 
3. Loans disbursed cumulative 
4. Loans repaid, cumulative 
5. Loans outstanding 
6. Overdue loan 
7. Group fund savings 
8. Personal voluntary savings 
9. Members’ total savings 

































1.5.  Policy and regulatory framework 
 
Overall policy environment: During the 90s the government has created a new policy environment 
focussing on democratization, decentralization and local participation, economic and financial 
liberalization including interest rate deregulation, poverty alleviation, and a legal framework for MFIs. 
While opening up to the outside world including external markets, the government also showed a new 
positive attitude to NGOs and their role as facilitators in the process of development at the grassroots 
level. The government renewed its emphasis on alleviating the plight of the rural poor including 
women. While poverty alleviation was considered a matter of charity in the past, it is now being 
increasingly realized that rural financial systems development along the rules of a market economy, 
with an emphasis on the viability of institutions and programs, opens up new avenues for sustainable 
poverty alleviation on an ever-increasing scale of outreach. 
 
Poverty alleviation policies: Poverty has been a pervasive problem in Nepal. The government first 
responded to the problems of extreme rural underdevelopment at the time of absolute monarchy. In 
1968, it set up an agricultural development bank (ADBN) and subsequently, 1975, established a Small 
Farmers Development Project (SFDP) to stimulate agricultural production by providing credit and 
related training and consultancy services through ADBN. Other interventions followed, among them 
the Intensive Banking Program in 1981, with preferential credit the principal tool to alleviate poverty. 
As usual at that time among governments and donors, the approach was supply-driven and top-down, 
resulting in the rapid deterioration of the financial health of the programs and its handling institutions. 
Groups were established as a grassroots channeling mechanism, without a notion of institutional 
autonomy as local financial intermediaries. Pre-existing self-organized savings and credit groups, 
many of them of indigenous origin, were ignored. To some extent, there might have been a positive 
impact on agricultural production; but that impact remained restricted by the failure of credit services 
to grow dynamically and by the neglect of savings deposit facilities.  
 
Financial policy and regulatory framework: In recent years, the development of rural financial 
institutions has gained much attention in N epal's two chief monetary and financial policy-making 
institutions: the Ministry of Finance and the central bank, Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB). New legal forms 
have been created that are of relevancy for microfinance services, among them Development Banks 
for G rameen replicators, Savings and Finance Companies, and Small Farmer Cooperatives Ltd. A 
cooperative banking act is presently under preparation. NRB is in charge of bank supervision.  
 
The central bank, NRB, is favorably disposed towards deregulation and the licensing of MFIs 
focussing on the poor. To promote the establishment of banks with a local outreach, NRB has recently   8
differentiated equity capital requirements for rural development banks: Rs 2.5 million ($44,000) for 
banks working in a single district, Rs 5 million for banks working in two or three districts and Rs 10 
million for those working in four to ten districts. 
 
The financial system of Nepal has been partially liberalized in recent years. Banks and other financial 
institutions are free to set their own interest rates on deposits and loans. Average bank lending rates 
are around 18% in commercial lending and 11% in preferential lending. By comparison, interest rates 
in the informal financial sector are around 35% in the mountains and 43% in the plains. The average 
interbank rate was below 10% in July 1996; the treasury bill rate was 12.8% (up from 3.8% in January 
1994). The banks' freedom is restricted by two major factors: a NRB directive limiting the spread 
between deposit and lending rates to 6% (except for the Grameen type development banks and 
NGOs); and the prevalence of subsidized credit, which includes a provision for commercial banks to 
allocate 12% of their loan portfolio to priority sectors in agriculture, cottage industry and services. 
Financial institutions are obligated to lend against collateral. An exception is made up to a certain 
level for loans to low income families and solidarity groups.  
 
Deposit taking from the general public is restricted to commercial and development banks as well as 
finance companies. NGOs and savings and credit organizations including cooperatives with NRB 
permission for limited banking operations are only authorized to accept deposits from their members. 
Deposits collected by finance companies, cooperative  credit societies and savings and credit 
organizations are limited to the tenfold of their equity capital. They also have to maintain a minimum 
of 10% liquidity of their deposit liabilities. Banks and finance companies have to adhere to capital 
requirements as a percentage of total assets and risk assets as prescribed by NRB. 
 
As average transaction costs from institutional sources in rural Nepal have been estimated at 6% (at 
presently given terms and conditions), ranging from 1% on large loans (above Rs 50,000) to 11% on 
small loans (below Rs 5,000), restrictions on the margin militate against lending to small and marginal 
borrowers, lead to risk aversive lending and shift transaction costs to borrowers (i.e.,, eliminating 
customer-friendly services). They are also likely to undermine the financial viability of the banks. 
 
One of the more interesting microfinance innovations in the Asian-Pacific region is the transformation 
of the sub-project offices of the SFDP into autonomous local financial institutions owned and 
managed by their members in the form of Small Farmer Cooperatives Ltd. (SFCL) - apparently with a 
remarkable impact on institutional viability and sustainability as indicated above. The significance of 
this experiment extends far beyond SFDP. Many government-owned agricultural development banks 
in the region might want to take a close look at it during an exposure program. 
 
2.  Assessment of microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
 
Six MFIs were selected as indicative case studies: 
 
(a)  Two pioneering Grameen replicators: Purbanchal Grameen Bikas Bank (PUGBB), one of five 
government-sponsored Grameen type banks with legal status under the Development Bank 
Act; and Nirdhan, one of two NGO replicators and the first of all replicators in the field. Both 
are located in the plains of Nepal 
 
(b)  Two out of 49 NGOs sponsored through the governmental Rural Self Reliance Fund (RSF): 
Adarsha Krishak Samanbaya Samiti (Adarsha) and Vyccu Bachat Tatha Rin Sahakari Samstha 
(Vyccu) 
 
(c)  Two out of 233 cooperatives engaged in microfinance and registered under the Cooperative 
Act of 1992: the Small Farmer Cooperative Limited (SFCL) in Bhumisthan, Dhading, which 
is one of 53 pioneers of ADBN's new GTZ-supported strategy of transforming some 400+ 
SFDP sub-project offices into autonomous local financial intermediaries owned and managed 
by their members; and the privately organized Navajiban Cooperative Limited in Dhangadi   9
(Navajiban) as one out of ten commercially oriented cooperatives authorized to undertake 
banking functions. 
 
Of the six cases,  Purbanchal Grameen Bikas Bank, a government-owned regional development 
bank, has been singled out for a more elaborate presentation. Originally registered in 1992 under the 
Commercial Bank Act of 1974, it started its financial operations on August 8, 1993; as of March 1996, 
it fell under the newly enacted Development Bank Act. Two years after its start, its equity capital of 
Rs 30 million was doubled to Rs 60 million of which the central bank (NRB) held 66.75%, the 
government 8.25 % and each of the five state-owned commercial banks 5%. The bank has been 
selected here as an example of the Grameen approach geared to a disadvantaged segment of the Nepali 
population, namely women under the poverty line. After little over two years of operation, it attained 
about the same outreach as the third-largest poverty lending program of the government, Production 
Credit for Rural Women; it accounted for 75% of the poor women covered by the seven Grameen 
replicators in 1995; and it is projected to reach about half the number of households in its region of 
operation within the next three years that SFDP has covered nationally after twenty years of existence. 
Both its capital and governance structure indicate that Purbanchal Grameen Bikas Bank is a 
government  bank. Its board of directors is exclusively recruited from government institutions: the 
NRB, the Ministry of Finance and the state-owned commercial banks; the chairman (so far from NRB) 
and the executive director (from one of the commercial banks) are elected from among the board 
members - with prior government approval. The Bank also illustrates the severe struggle for viability 
of a government-owned poverty lending institution. 
 
2.1.  Outreach 
 
The outreach figures for the six sample institutions reflect different policies. The Grameen replicators, 
foremost among them the Bikas Bank with over 26,000 clients, cover a wide geographical area. The 
other institutions tend to be limited to a small number of villages usually under one Village 
Development Committee (VDC). Only informal institutions, which are excluded from the sample, 
tend to recruit their members from single villages. The Grameen replicators and the SFCL recruit their 
members from among the poor only; in addition, the former restrict participation to women. In all 
three program approaches, the number of savers exceeds that of the borrowers, which mostly reflects 
the fact that saving is a compulsory program requirement.
5  In nondiscriminating institutions, men, 
who are usually the heads of households, outnumber women by a wide margin. This is usually due to a 
policy of limiting memberships or loans to only one family member at a time, resulting in a restriction 
of access to credit for women's own income-generating activities. To widen outreach, program 
managers may be encouraged to lift that restriction; and to promote the establishment of women's own 
units or subunits, e.g. at the village or village group level. 
 
                                                                 
5  However half of these institutions and programs are credit-driven and borrower-oriented, namely the 
two Grameen replicators and, at least to date, the SFCL. Unlike some of the institutions from Indonesia where 
poor savers outnumber poor borrowers by a wide margin, these three institutions in Nepal fail to appeal to 
savers. Indeed, access to cheap donor and government funds makes it in the short run economically rational 
behavior to rely on external resources rather than own savings with their high mobilization costs.   10
Table 2.1:Outreach of six sample MFIs in Nepal, December 1995 
 
MFI  B o r r o w e r s    S a v e r s
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  No.  % poor  % female    No.  % poor  % female 
(a) Grameen: 
      Bank: PUGBB 
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Whether MFIs should broaden their outreach or put more emphasis on deepening their services and 
impact is a challenging issue to be left to their member-customers and management rather than 
policymakers and donors. There does not seem to be an inherent advantage of one strategy over the 
other. 
 
Purbanchal Grameen Bikas Bank:
7 The Bank is located in the eastern plains. Its objective is the 
provision of financial services, particularly access to credit, to all women in the eastern region that fall 
under the poverty line.
8 The Bank has a dual delivery structure, comprising a bank structure and a 
member structure. As of 1995/96, the Bank consisted of a head office, six area offices and 29 
branches. On average there are five branches per area office. Each branch has a staff of 6-10. The total 
number of staff is 256 of which 35 (14%) are in the head office. 127, or 50%, are field assistants who 
work directly with the women's groups in the field. Incentive schemes have not been introduced. 
 
During its first fiscal year, 1993/94, the Bank enrolled 8,294 women; in 1994/95 14,992; and in 
1995/96 another 5,667, bringing the total to 28,953. The members are organized in about 5,800 groups 
of five women which in turn form 827 centers of seven groups each. The Bank's growth projection 
until the year 1998/99 is about 81,500 members (this would equal half of SFDP's present national 
outreach) in some 16,300 groups and 2,000 centers. 
 
Prospective members are attracted through public meetings and house-to-house visits. Groups of five 
women each are formed, and the members of three groups jointly receive one or two weeks of training, 
one hour per day, in the Grameen technology - reportedly with only little adjustment to the Nepali 
context. Five of the fifteen participants usually drop out, and the remaining ten form two solidarity 
groups. Reasons given for dropping out include fear of loosing property, ignorance, husband's 
interference and discouragement from landlords, moneylenders or politicians. As in Bangladesh, 
Grameen banking seems to be perceived by local authorities and leaders not just as a financial 
business but as a type of social revolution centering on the role of women in society. 
                                                                 
6  Borrowers and savers cannot be simply added up to arrive at the total number of members or customers; 
the larger one of the two figures is usually equivalent to the total. 
7  Reported figures usually pertain to one of two reporting dates, the end of the fiscal year, July 16, and 
the end of the calendar year, December 31. Due to differences in reporting time, there may thus be wide 
divergences between figures for the same year. 
8  A household of five with land holdings not exceeding 0.68 ha (1.0 bigha) is officially defined as poor. 
Participants are mainly identified on the basis of land ownership and the quality of their housing. According to a 
housing indexation test in one of the poorest areas of the bank, Jhumka, 84% in a sample of 50 households were 
poor, 12% not so poor and 4% non-poor. Outreach to the non-poor is usually defined as leakage (supposedly of 
scarce government or donor funds earmarked for poverty lending) by Grameen replicators and not welcomed.   11
 
The Bank is very much credit-oriented, with virtually every group member becoming a borrower. 
There are three loan products: general loans with a one-year maturity and weekly installments 
accounting for 98% of all loans outstanding (1995/96), six-months seasonal loans due upon maturity, 
and irrigation loans. In addition, 50% of the compulsory group savings, which are not withdrawable, 
can be lent by the groups to their members at interest rates fixed by the group for emergency and 
consumption purposes. The percentage of borrowers during the three years was 83%, 92.5% and 98%, 
respectively. During the same time average loan size (disbursed) grew from Rs 4,400 to Rs 7,100 
($125) and average savings from a meager Rs 378 to Rs 787 ($14). The demand for loans of larger 
sizes outstrips the supply by far. The bank practices a system of incremental repeat loans, with a 
ceiling of Rs 15,000 for third-term borrowers. The total volume of loans outstanding grew from Rs 
18.8 million in 1993/94 to Rs 119.3 million in 1995/96, total savings from Rs 3.1 million (16.5% of 
loans outstanding) to Rs 22.8 million (19.1% of loans outstanding) in 1995/96. With 92.5% of the 
savings accumulated through regular compulsory group savings in 1995/96, the mobilization of 
irregular voluntary savings of varying sizes is of negligible importance.  
 
Table 2.2:  Outreach of Purbanchal Grameen Bikas Bank, 1993/94-1995/96 (July) 
 
  1993/94  1994/95  1995/96 
Number of members   8,294  23,286  28,953 
Number of borrowers  6,890  21,538  28,271 
Percentage of borrowers  83.1%  92.5%  97.6% 
Av. loan disbursed (Rs)  4,400  5,594  7,100 
Av. loan outstanding (Rs)  2,735  3,318  4,284 
Average savings (Rs)  378  462  787 
Loans outstanding (Rs mn)  18.8  71.5  119.3 
Savings deposits (Rs mn)  3.1  10.8  22.8 
Savings/loans outstanding  16.5%  15.1%  19.1% 
 
 
2.2.  Financial viability and sustainability 
 
Of the six MFIs studied in Nepal, only the two Grameen replicators are low in both operational and 
financial self-sufficiency which may be partially attributed to their recent origin. However, this does 
not explain the difference between the bank and the NGO, as both became operational in 1993. In 
terms of self-sufficiency, the bank performs much more poorly than the NGO: surprisingly as it is a 
bank; perhaps unsurprisingly as it is government-owned. However, in 1995/96, the bank's self-reliance 
indicators jumped from 18% to 47% and from 15% to 34%, respectively, bringing it somewhat closer 
to the level of the NGO. The organizations under the RSF and the cooperatives are operationally fully 
self-sufficient; the conventional cooperative is also financially fully self-sufficient. Vyccu, Adarsha 
and the SFCL have rates of full financial self-sufficiency from 71% to 84%. The on-time repayment 
rate is perfect, or near-perfect, among the Grameen replicators and the RSF organizations. The on-time 
repayment performance of Navajiban is near-satisfactory. The SFCL is a special case, as the figure of 
64% conceals wide variations depending on the source of funds: the repayment rate of loans from 
internally mobilized resources is 100%; of loans channeled on behalf of ADBN since their institutional 
autonomy around 80%; and of loans handed over at the time of its establishment as an SFCL (shrunk 
by now to a portfolio of bad debts) around 20%.  
 
On the whole, cooperatives appear to be the most outstanding performers while the Grameen 
replicators still have a long way to go to become self-reliant. Despite the recent deregulation of interest 
rates, the MFIs continue to charge rates of interest around and below 20%, which is usually not 
sufficient to cover the costs and risks of microloans. Navajiban is an exception as its average loan size 
(appr. US$ 1,500) is more than 25 times the size of the Grameen replicators and 6-13 times the size of 
loans by the other organizations.   12
Table 2.3:Operational and financial self-sufficiency in six MFIs in Nepal, 1995 
 
  Grameen repl's    Rural Self-Rel.    Cooperatives 
  Bank  NGO    Vyccu  Adarsha    SFCL  Navajiban 
Lending rate of interest  20  20    18  18    15-18  12-21 
On-time repayment rate  100  100    97  100    64  92 
Mean loan size (Rs. '000)  3.15  3.39    9.20  13.72    6.66  84.13 
Degree of partial financial 















Degree full of financial 













* These data pertain to July 1996. 
 
 
Purbanchal Grameen Bikas Bank: After three years of operation, the bank is still far from breaking 
even. In absolute terms its net loss was Rs 4.86 million (78% of total expenditure) in 1993/94; Rs 
12.98 million (78% of total expenditure) in 1994/95 and Rs 10.96 million (46% of total expenditure) 
in 1995/96.
9 In terms of the volume of loans outstanding, the losses amount to 25.8%, 18.2% and 
9.2%, respectively. In terms of total assets, the losses are 6.8%, 11.0% and 5.9%, respectively. The 
Bank's degree of partial financial self-sufficiency has jumped from 0% in 1993/94 to 47% in 1995/96 
and hopes to achieve a 100%-rate in 1996/97. Its degree of full financial self-sufficiency has increased 
from 0% in 1993/94 to 15% in 1994/95 and 34% in 1995/96. 
 
The Bank projects to become financially fully self-sufficient within three years, i.e. until 1998/99. 
However, the Bank ignores the fact that the value of the subsidy element has been increasing rapidly 
in terms of actual costs, namely from 17% in 1993/94 to 39% in 1995/96, making the bank donor-
dependent and vulnerable. If the opportunity costs of the Bank's equity capital contributed by the 
government are taken into consideration, the dependency (and, concomitantly, lack of autonomy in 
decision-making) is even more pronounced. While some consider these projections as overly 
optimistic, other derive hope from the fact that eight of the 29 branches have reported operational 
profits within three years (disregarding the value of grants and soft loans). Additional indicators of 
performance are given in the table below. 
 
There is a host of factors militating against viability in Purbanchal Grameen Bikas Bank. But as 
important as they are, there is at least one factor which so far has not undermined the bank's viability, 
and that is the repayment behavior of its customers. The women repay their loans; to date no loan 
losses have been reported. However, as groups age, the Bank, like all government programs for the 
poor, might experience a slackening of repayment morale. 
 
The first factor which militates against viability lies in the bank's governance structure. Being owned 
by government institutions, there is no vested interest in profitability. To the contrary, the bank finds 
itself under political pressure to lend to the poor at low interest rates at which it cannot cover its costs. 
This lack of interest in the bank's viability relates not only to its owners but also to its management 
and staff. The branches are not run as profit centers; nor are there any employee incentive schemes. 
While access to cheap central and commercial bank funds may be considered an asset as it lowers the 
costs of loanable funds, its actual impact is the opposite, leading to a distortion of the cost structure 
and, presumably, a general lack of cost awareness among the bank's management and staff. 
 
                                                                 
9  Data for 1993/94 and 1994/95 are audited, data for 1995/96 are provisional.   13
 
Table 2.4:  Performance indicators for Purbanchal Grameen Bikas Bank, July 1993/94, 1994/95 
and 1995/96 (Rupie amounts in thousands) 
  1993/94  1994/95  1995/96 
Operating expenditure   6,077  14,940  19,399 
Interest paid on deposits   112  404  1,057 
Interest paid on soft loans: 
Amount actually paid 










Loan loss provision: 
Actual amount 


























Subsidy element/actual cost (in percent)  16.7%  24.3%  39.3% 
Groups per branch  638  803  998 
Groups per FA (field assistant)  82  185  233 
Loan amount per FA  187  567  962 
Savings per FA  31  85  188 
Average salary of FA in percent of GDP/p.c.  256%  363%  440% 
Loanable savings deposits  3,012  10,218  21,648 
Soft loans and grants  10,000  36,111  85,518 
Loans outstanding  18,846  71,459  119,262 
Loss/Total expenditure  78%  78%  46% 
Loss/Loans outstanding  25.8%  18.2%  9.2% 
Loss/Total assets  6.8%  11.0%  5.9% 












* The subsidy element is calculated as the total of the value of payments on borrowings at the market 
rate minus actual soft loan interest payments (lines 5 and 4) plus loan loss provisions of 2% of loans 
outstanding minus the actual loan loss provision (lines 8 and 7). 
 
 
The bank's delivery system is expensive - a second factor impeding viability. Salaries alone accounted 
for 57% to 58% of total expenditures in each of the last three years of operation; while salaries and 
office expenses together accounted for 98% in 1993/94, 90% in 1994/95 and 81% in 1995/96. During 
the three years interest expenses on savings deposits were 1.8%, 2.4% and 4.4%, respectively, of total 
costs; while interest expenses on borrowings grew from 0.6% to 6.2% and 14.4%, respectively. In 
terms of loans outstanding as recorded in the balance sheet, expenditures for salaries and office 
expenses were 32%, 21% and 16% during the three respective years - a declining trend. There are 
already signs of a decline in the dynamics of expansion indicated by the number of groups formed on 
average by field staff: 82 groups during the first year, 119 during the second year and only 45 during 
the third year, while the number of field staff grew only slightly, namely from 101 in 1993/94 to 126 
in 1994/95 and 127 in 1995/96. Political interference is cited as one of the background factors, which 
includes changes in bank leadership parallel to changes in the political system of the country. Another 
factor is of course that field staff reach the limits of their capacity as they are obligated to participate in 
group and center meetings. 
 
A third factor lies in the interest rate of loans which is below a genuine rural market rate. The Bank 
pays 7.5% on savings deposits (close to the commercial bank savings deposit rate of 8%), 6% on old 
soft loans (Rs 63.7 million) and 8% on its most recent soft loan (Rs 20.4 million). Under political 
pressure to approximate poverty lending standards, the bank charges 20% on its loans to the groups, 
which is only slightly higher than the commercial bank rate and a fraction of informal lending rates.   14
Interest rates are not differentiated according to loan product, which makes it unattractive for the bank 
to offer products with customer-friendly services, such as doorstep collection of instalments. This 
would lower borrower transaction costs substantially while of course increasing the lender's 
transaction costs   however with the result of a net decrease in overall transaction costs! Under 
political pressure, the Banks finds itself unable to raise interest rates sufficiently to cover its costs. As 
elsewhere, this invariably leads to loan rationing, curtailing loan sizes as well as the overall lending 
volume. This limits the women's access to credit and thus restricts their ability to invest a sufficient 
amount of resources into income-generating activities with the highest rate of return. The low interest 
rates may be beneficial to politicians; but they certainly do not benefit the poor women. In this case, 
small is not beautiful. To the contrary, inadequate loan sizes tend to keep the women in poverty.  
 
The groups are not considered as financial intermediaries - a fourth factor. Serving only as credit 
channels with joint liability functions, they cannot set their own interest rates on loans received from 
the Bank; nor can they add a margin. Given the standardization of loan sizes and compulsory savings 
deductions, individual transactions are all reduced to the lowest level affordable by each group 
member. However, there is a 5% compulsory savings deduction from every loan disbursed 50% of 
which the groups can lend on their own terms. This might open the door to the proper pricing of loan 
products   provided the fields assistants do not advise against it. 
 
Another factor lies in the bank's exclusive targeting of poor women who accept the solidarity group 
approach. This leaves out some wealthier community members and their potential savings deposits 
and others with a potential request for larger loan sizes which would contribute to the bank's 
economies of scale. 
 
Closely related to this is a sixth factor: the bank's sole reliance on the group approach. This is likely to 
save transaction costs when banking with the poor. But it excludes bigger customers with widely 
diverging savings potentials and credit needs who might be better served with an individual 
technology. 
 
The Bank faces a great challenge. According to the NRB/ADB Rural Credit Survey of 1991/92 only 
6% of the landless and 12% of marginal farmers have access to institutional credit. The percentage of 
the poor with access to savings deposit facilities (not to mention collection services) is close to zero. 
Moreover, the fact that vast numbers of the poor need savings deposit services much more than access 
to credit is widely ignored. Yet it is the accumulation of savings which would strengthen the much-
needed self-financing capacity of the poor. To overcome its shortcomings, the Bank would have to 
undergo a major transformation in order to effectively meet the challenge of serving a substantial 
portion of its potential market. 
 
2.3.  Resource mobilization 
 
Of the six sample MFIs studied in Nepal, the two Grameen replicators are among the weakest in terms 
of internal resource mobilization. With savings constituting only 16% and 18%, respectively, of loans 
outstanding, they largely depend on donor funding. In case of withdrawal of external funds, they 
would not be sustainable. The two organizations under the Rural Self-Reliance Fund present a 
discrepant picture: Vyccu has savings equivalent to half the amount of loans outstanding, while 
Adarsha's loans outstanding are fully matched by its internal resources.  Similarly, Navajiban fully 
mobilizes its own resources while the other cooperative, SFCL Bhumistan, still continues to serve as a 
channel for ADBN funds. Within the first three years of its operation, the SFCL has mobilized from its 
788 members Rs 0.58 million (a mere US$ 13 per member). Interestingly, the raising of compulsory 
share capital contributions has been of minor importance, accounting for only  7.1% of its own 
resources as of 1/1996. Voluntary savings, 72.5% of resources, make up the bulk. In addition, 
livestock insurance, accounting for 20.4%, has contributed in an innovative way to the group's internal 
resources. In all MFIs, voluntary withdrawable savings have the greatest growth potential, particularly 
when collected through doorstep services, as recently demonstrated by the Himalaya Finance and 
Savings Company Ltd. 
   15
 
Table 2.5:Resource mobilization in six MFIs in Nepal, December 1995 
 
  Grameen repl's    Rural Self-Rel.    Cooperatives 
  Bank  NGO    Vyccu  Adarsha    SFCL  Navajiban 
Savings (million Rs.)  13.92  1.03    0.23  1.20    0.56  17.86 
Loans outstanding (mn Rs.)  78.74  6.56    0.45  1.19    4.94  17.84 
Savings/loans out'g (in %)  18  16    51  100    11  100 
 
 
On the whole it is concluded that resource mobilization and the range of financial services offered by 
the MFIs, comprising nominal fees, share subscriptions, regular compulsory savings and, to a 
restricted extent, voluntary savings, is quite limited. A wider range of savings products and collection 
services is generally lacking. There are virtually no reciprocal products of combined savings and 
installment collection. Donor and government funding and the policy of interest rate subsidization of 
bank microloans have greatly undermined the motivation of the MFIs to mobilize their own resources. 
In addition, an inverse interest structure which resulted from the channeling of government funding 
through MFIs at preferential terms has in the past greatly impeded the mobilization of voluntary 
savings. 
 
Purbanchal Grameen Bikas Bank: The Bank has been remarkably successful in mobilizing external 
resources. For its start it obtained Rs 24 million in equity capital from government sources which were 
augmented to Rs 60 million after two years. The central bank, NRB, with two thirds of the paid-in 
capital, is the major equity holder. The state-owned commercial banks and the government contributed 
the rest. In addition, the Bank has borrowed Rs 10 million in 1993/94, Rs 36.1 million in 1994/95 and 
Rs. 49.4 million in 1995/96. The amount of borrowings outstanding as of July 1996 was Rs 85.5 
million. In the framework of the compulsory deprived sector lending program, government-owned 
banks supplied 46.5% of the borrowings and private banks another 50.8%. The remaining 2.6% came 
from the Grameen Trust in Bangladesh for the scaling-up for one of the branches. 
 
Despite the fact that development banks are authorized by the banking law to mobilize savings from 
the general public, the Bank has restricted its internal resource mobilization to the group members. It 
offers two types of savings products: compulsory group savings amounting to a 5% deduction from 
every loan and voluntary savings. Little effort is being made by the bank to tap the savings potential of 
its members. In 1994/95 compulsory group savings accounted for 85% and individual voluntary 
savings for 15%. In the following year, 1995/96, the share of compulsory increased to 94% while 
voluntary savings fell to 6%. The future of voluntary savings in Purbanchal Grameen Bikas Bank 
appears bleak, with projections of the share of voluntary savings of 1.7% for 1996/97, 1.4% for 
1997/98 and 1.3% for 1998/99. 
 
During the preceding three years there was no clear trend concerning the p roportion of savings 
deposits in terms of loans outstanding. Their share was 16.5% in 1993/94, 15.1% in 1994/95 and 
19.1% in 1995/96 (cf. Table 2.2). There does not seem to be a policy within the Bank to step up its 
internal resource mobilization. To the contrary, the Bank's projections until 1999 show proportions of 
10.4% for each one of the next three fiscal years. 
 
The Bank's resource mobilization policy seems to be geared to external resources rather than internal 
savings. During the three preceding years, new borrowings from commercial sources amounted to 
53.1%, 50.5% and 41.4%, respectively, of loans outstanding; while borrowings outstanding amounted 
to 53.1%, 50.5% and 71.7% of loans outstanding. For each one of the next three years the Bank has 
projected the share of borrowings at 93% of loans outstanding.   16
 
Table 2.6:  Resource mobilization by Purbanchal Grameen Bikas Bank, July 1993/94, 1994/95 
and 1995/96 (amounts in Rs million) 
 
  1993/94  1994/95  1995/96 
Paid-up capital   24.0  60.0  60.0 
New commercial borrowing  10.0  36.1  49.4 
New borrowings/Loans outstanding in percent  53.1%  50.5%  41.4% 
Borrowings outstanding  10.0  36.1  85.5* 
Borrowings outst'g/Loans outst'g in percent  53.1%  50.5%  71.7% 
Compulsory savings/Total savings in percent  .  85.0%  94.0% 
Savings deposits/Loans outstanding  16.5%  15.1%  18.8% 
* This includes Rs 83.26 million from commercial banks and Rs 2.27 million from Grameen Trust. 
 
 
Some observers have concluded that there is only one way of reversing the Bank's trend towards 
increased external resource dependency: privatization. While this may appear as an ideological issue 
to some, others have pointed out that time and again governments have been generous in supporting 
new poverty-lending initiatives, but sooner or later, under budgetary constraints and concerns for 
macroeconomic stability, have retracted their support. This has usually led to the collapse of those 
institutions which did not possess the foresight of preparing for the day of enforced self-reliance. This 
is a thorny issue for the Bank. For its government owners would have to foresee, and prepare for, their 
own withdrawal. 
 
2.4.  Regulatory framework  
 
With regard to microfinance for the poor, a number of issues remain to be resolved at the policy and 
regulatory level in Nepal:  
 
•  the adoption of an overall microfinance systems development approach, which includes the 
systematic coordination of the various measures and donor contributions;  
•  the establishment of self-organized second-tier regulatory authorities for the various networks of 
MFIs, providing guidance, business representation, institution-building, supervisory and 
refinancing services that exceed the capacities of the Nepal Rastra Bank and the Department of 
Cooperatives, respectively;  
•  the actual implementation of differentiated, market-oriented interest rates, which would generally 
have to be far above the commercial bank prime rate in order to cover the costs of intermediation;  
•  the curtailment and, eventually, the abolishment of preferential lending programs, which distort 
rural financial markets and set up an unfair competition to market-oriented microfinance 
institutions;  
•  the abolishment of microloan interest rate subsidies, which undermine savings mobilization;  
•  a stop to all practices of using microfinance institutions as channels for programs with terms and 
conditions set by governments and donors   to be replaced by an emphasis on internal resource 
mobilization which may be complemented by a system of liquidity exchange among related 
institutions and access to sources of portfolio refinancing at market terms;  
•  the promotion of innovative linkages between institutions belonging to the various financial 
subsectors; 
•  the selection and testing of successful microcredit, microsavings and microinsurance products and 
strategies and their dissemination throughout the formal, semiformal and informal financial sectors; 
•  the strengthening of the autonomy of all financial institutions including the central bank, NRB; 
•  the promotion of governance structures and incentive schemes which are conducive to the viability 
and growth of microfinance institutions; 
•  the privatization of government-owned microfinance institutions. 
   17
These issues will only be resolved in the best interest of the poor if there is adequate coordination and 
close cooperation between MFIs, their customer or members, government agencies, and donors.   18
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